

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY PM:EDNEWSOM:MTM

APPROVED BY PM:LGELB

S/S:DANDERSON

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

S, S/W, AND PM ONLY

-----111418 162352Z /61

O 162302Z JUN 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LESLIE GELB

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: LUNCH AGENDA WITH BROWN/BRZEZINSKI MONDAY, JUNE 19

1. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

A. DURATION OF A TREATY

B. TIMING AND RELATIONSHIP TO SALT

2. ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS: FUTURE STRATEGY

3. MBFR AND THE FRENCH INITIATIVE FOR A EUROPEAN
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

MATERIAL ON THESE ITEMS FOLLOWS.

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO DEBRIEF ZBIG AND HAROLD ON YOUR OECD
TRIP AND THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER.

CTB ITEM A

1. ISSUE: CAN WE DEFUSE OPPOSITION TO CTB ON VERIFICATION
AND STOCKPILE RELIABILITY GROUNDS BY MOVING FROM A FIVE-
TO THREE-YEAR APPROACH?

2. DISCUSSION: THERE ARE MERITS TO A SHORTER DURATION

TREATY:

- A. JCS AND DOE CONCERN FOR WEAPONS RELIABILITY AND LOSS OF LAB TALENT WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THEY WOULD ACCEPT THIS SOLUTION.

- B. IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD, THE SOVIETS COULDN'T MAKE SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS IMPROVEMENTS EVEN BY CHEATING. CONCERN OVER VERIFICATION WOULD ALSO BE REDUCED.

- C. THIS APPROACH WOULD HELP NEGOTIABILITY BY FURTHER REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SINGLE STATIONS REQUIRED AND ELIMINATING THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRAYS. IT WOULD ALSO MATCH THE SOVIETS' THREE-YEAR PROPOSAL FOR DURATION.

3. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

- -- JCS AND DOE MAY STILL END UP OPPOSING EVEN A THREE-YEAR BAN BECAUSE THEY MIGHT SEE THE RISK OF EXTENDING SUCH A BAN AS BEING TOO GREAT.

- -- IT'S QUESTIONABLE WHETHER WE COULD GET ANY MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENTS IN VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES FROM AN ISI
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

NETWORK, SINCE IT COULDN'T BE OPERATIONAL IN LESS THAN TWO YEARS (WITH PERHAPS ONLY A YEAR LEFT TO GO).

- -- A THREE-YEAR TREATY WILL BE SEEN BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AS BEING EVEN LESS RESPONSIVE TO OUR NPT OBLIGATIONS THAN A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT. WE WOULDN'T HELP OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AS MUCH. SUBMITTING A THREE-YEAR TREATY TO THE CCD WOULD SLOW THINGS DOWN AND PUT PRESSURE ON US TO CONSIDER AN AGREEMENT OF LONGER DURATION.

4. PREFERRED ACTION: OBTAIN ZBIG'S AND HAROLD'S AGREEMENT TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE MOVE AHEAD WITH A THREE-YEAR APPROACH.

CTB ITEM B

1. ISSUE: WHAT'S THE PROSPECT OF CTB GOING TO THE HILL BEFORE SALT II AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR OUR NEGOTIATING STRATEGY?

2. DISCUSSION: IT'S POSSIBLE (BUT NOT CERTAIN) THAT WE COULD WRAP UP A TRILATERAL CTB AGREEMENT BY, SAY, SEPTEMBER.

--A THREE-YEAR TREATY WOULD MAKE SOVIETS MORE WILLING TO RESOLVE OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES. BUT IT'S NOT

GOING TO BE EASY TO SETTLE SUCH QUESTIONS AS INTERNAL STATIONS AND DETAILS OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS.

--STICKING WITH OUR PRESENT POLICY OF SUBMITTING A TRILATERAL DRAFT TEXT TO THE MULTILATERAL CCD FORUM WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY DELAY ITS SIGNING. IT WOULD PROBABLY PUSH OFF BY AS MUCH AS A YEAR OUR SENDING A CTB TO THE HILL.

--IF THE CTB MOVES TO THE HILL BEFORE SALT II, WE
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

COULD RISK LOSING THE TEST BAN AND HURTING CHANCES FOR SALT RATIFICATION.

--IT COULD INVITE A COALITION OF ARMS CONTROL OPPONENTS WHO COULD SEE THIS AS A PRELUDE TO SALT II. CTB HAS ITS OWN RATIFICATION PROBLEMS (VERIFICATION AND STOCKPILE RELIABILITY).

--WE PROBABLY WOULDN'T EXPEND SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL CAPITAL SEEKING CTB SUPPORT. WE'D NEED ALL WE HAVE FOR THE SALT BATTLE STILL TO COME.

3. THEREFORE, OUR STRATEGY SHOULD BE:

- A. PROCEED WITH TRILATERAL CTB NEGOTIATIONS, WITH PROSPECT OF A US/USSR/UK AGREEMENT IN THE EARLY FALL.

- B. REAFFIRM POLICY OF SUBMITTING TRILATERAL TREATY TO CCD; WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO SEND A CTB TO THE HILL UNTIL LATTER HALF OF 1979. (BYPASSING CCD COULD RAISE CONTROVERSIAL CHOICE OF DELIBERATELY DELAYING TRILATERAL CTB AGREEMENT IF WE DIDN'T WANT IT TO GO TO THE HILL BEFORE SALT II.)

4. PREFERRED ACTION: GET HAROLD AND ZBIG TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE STRATEGY, MOVE AHEAD WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AND

NOT PRESENT A CTB TREATY TO THE HILL BEFORE A SALT AGREEMENT.

ISSUES:

THE ATTACHED DISCUSSION PAPER RAISES A NUMBER OF ISSUES
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

ON ERW:

1) WHETHER WE SHOULD RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE MAKE A POSITIVE PRODUCTION DECISION BEFORE THE END OF THE

YEAR?

2) HOW TO HANDLE THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH A POSITIVE DECISION, SUCH AS PUBLIC PRESENTATION, THE QUESTION OF SOVIET RESTRAINT, AND CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES?

3) HOW TO MANAGE THE ER ISSUE IN THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE PRODUCTION DECISION, INCLUDING WHAT OUR PUBLIC POSITION SHOULD BE, WHAT TO DO ABOUT COMPONENT PRODUCTION, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES?

FACTORS:

ON THE FIRST, AND MOST BASIC ISSUE, THERE ARE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

-- PM FEELS WE SHOULD MAKE A POSITIVE PRODUCTION DECISION THIS YEAR: THE CLIMATE IS PROPITIOUS AND IT COULD BUILD SUPPORT FOR SALT.

-- EUR AND S/P THINK A DECISION WOULD RESURRECT A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN THE ALLIANCE, AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD REMAIN ON THE COURSE THE PRESIDENT SET ON APRIL 7.

ON THE SECOND SET OF ISSUES, SHOULD THERE BE A POSITIVE PRODUCTION DECISION THIS YEAR, WE SHOULD:

-- TAKE THE PUBLIC POSITION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED NOTHING BUT A MUTUAL ER BAN, WHICH WE HAVE REJECTED.

-- EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS NOT TO DEPLOY IF THE SOVIETS SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

SHOW THE KIND OF RESTRAINT THAT WOULD HAVE HEADED OFF PRODUCTION.

-- NOT ASK ANY FURTHER COMMITMENTS FROM OUR ALLIES ON PRODUCTION OR DEPLOYMENT, BUT ASK THAT THEY MAKE NO NEGATIVE COMMENTS ON THE DECISION. THEY HAVE ALWAYS WANTED US TO MAKE A PRODUCTION DECISION AS A SOVEREIGN, UNILATERAL ACT.

ON THE THIRD GROUP OF ISSUES, IF WE ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE A POSITIVE PRODUCTION THIS YEAR, WE SHOULD:

-- NOT EMPHASIZE IN PUBLIC THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT SHOWN RESTRAINT; THIS COULD PROVOKE CRITICISM FOR NOT MAKING A POSITIVE PRODUCTION DECISION.

-- INCLUDE FUNDS IN THE FY 80 DOD AND DOE BUDGETS FOR PRODUCTION OF ERW COMPONENTS, TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY

OF OUR POSITION. ABSENCE OF FUNDING COULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION A DE FACTO NEGATIVE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE.

-- AVOID FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES. TO DO SO COULD LEAD TO ALLIED EFFORTS TO DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET RESTRAINTS SHOULD BE.

PREFERRED ACTION:

-- GIVEN THE WIDE DISAGREEMENT, SEEK ZBIG AND HAROLD'S AGREEMENT THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE PRESIDENT; SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE WEEKS OR MONTHS AHEAD MAY HELP US DECIDE THE BEST COURSE.

-- BUT, SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD JOINTLY
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

COME UP WITH STANDBY RATIONALES FOR EITHER CONTINGENCY: A PRODUCTION DECISION THIS FALL; OR A DECISION TO FUND ERW COMPONENTS ONLY IN THE FY 80 BUDGET.

ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS: FUTURE STRATEGY

WE NEED TO DECIDE ON A COURSE FOR HANDLING THE ERW ISSUE THROUGH THE REST OF THIS YEAR, ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF PRODUCTION POLICY, PUBLIC STANCE, RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS, ARMS CONTROL, AND BUDGET DECISIONS.

I. BASIC POLICY: SHOULD WE RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT AT THIS TIME THAT HE MAKE A POSITIVE DECISION ON PRODUCTION BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR?

-- THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF A POSITIVE DECISION AT THIS TIME INCLUDE RECENT STRONGLY FAVORABLE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS ERW, INCREASED ATTENTION HERE AND IN EUROPE TO THE SOVIET THREAT, WHICH SHOULD IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF ERW, -- PARTICULARLY IF WE WERE WILLING TO DIVORCE PRODUCTION FROM DEPLOYMENT -- AND THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH A POSITIVE DECISION MIGHT MAKE TO BOLSTERING THE PERCEIVED DECISIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO RESIST THE SOVIETS.

-- POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF AN EARLY DECISION INCLUDE THE DANGERS OF REOPENING THE ERW DEBATE WITH THE ALLIES, RAISING TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND CUTTING OFF ANY SERIOUS PROSPECT OF SOVIET RESTRAINT.

II. RELATED DECISIONS: IF WE CHOSE TO RECOMMEND A POSITIVE DECISION TO THE PRESIDENT, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ASSOCIATED ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH:

-- WHEN AND HOW SHOULD THAT DECISION BE MADE PUBLIC?

THIS COULD COVER THE RANGE FROM A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT TIED
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

TO SOVIET LACK OF RESTRAINT, TO A LOW KEY CONFIRMATION OF
THE PRESENCE OF FUNDING IN THE FY 1980 BUDGET AND OUR
INTENTION TO UTILIZE THE FUNDS FOR ERW;

-- HOW WOULD WE ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SHOWN
RESTRAINT, GIVEN THE SHORT TIME THAT WOULD HAVE ELAPSED
SINCE APRIL 7?

-- WHAT SORT OF CONSULTATIONS ARE REQUIRED WITH THE
ALLIES, AND WHAT COMMITMENTS WOULD WE EXPECT OF THEM?
EVEN IF WE WERE CLEANLY TO SEPARATE A PRODUCTION DECISION
FROM THE DEPLOYMENT QUESTION, THE ALLIES COULD NOT ESCAPE
QUESTIONING ON THEIR ULTIMATE WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE
WEAPONS, AND ON THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE US JUDGMENT THAT
THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SHOWN RESTRAINT. CONSULTATIONS COULD
RANGE FROM A QUICK INFORMATIONAL EFFORT, ASSUMING THE

ALLIES WOULD REITERATE THE POSITIONS THEY TOOK THIS
SPRING, TO AN EXTENSIVE EFFORT TO ELICIT COMMITMENTS ON
EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT.

III. MANAGING THE ISSUE IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRODUCTION
DECISION: EVEN IF WE DO NOT DECIDE TO RECOMMEND TO THE
PRESIDENT A POSITIVE DECISION IN THE NEAR TERM, THERE ARE
A NUMBER OF THINGS WHICH NEED TO BE CONSIDERED:

-- HOW SHOULD WE PITCH OUR RHETORIC--TO PREPARE FOR AN
EVENTUAL POSITIVE DECISION, OR TO KEEP THE ISSUE QUIET?

-- WHAT DECISIONS SHOULD WE MAKE ON THE PRODUCTION OF
ERW COMPONENTS, TO MAINTAIN OPEN THE OPTION OF EVENTUAL
PRODUCTION OF FULL SYSTEMS? OPTIONS RANGE FROM PRODUCTION
OF STANDARD FISSION WEAPONS ALONE, TO THE PRODUCTION OF
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

VIRTUALLY ALL THE ERW COMPONENTS AND MATERIALS, TO BE
STORED FOR INSTALLATION AT THE TIME OF A POSITIVE DECISION.

-- WHAT, IF ANY, INTERIM CONSULTATIONS ARE NEEDED WITH
THE ALLIES? OPTIONS RANGE FROM DETAILED CONSULTATIONS ON
THE DESIRABLE FORM OF RESTRAINT TO REQUIRE OF THE SOVIETS,
TO A HANDS OFF POLICY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE ARE READY TO
MAKE OUR DECISION.

MBFR AND FRENCH INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE

ISSUE: TO PREVENT FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN DISARM-
AMENT CONFERENCE FROM UNDERCUTTING MBFR AND CREATING
DIVISIONS AMONG OUR NATO ALLIES.

DISCUSSION:

THE FRENCH PROPOSAL COULD UNDERCUT MBFR AND DISRUPT THE
ALLIANCE IN SEVERAL WAYS:

-- WITH A SERIOUS EASTERN RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVE
ON THE TABLE AND DISCUSSION AND EXCHANGE OF DATA PRO-
CEEDING IN MBFR, A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATION
BASED ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE GROWING
PROSPECTS FOR REAL PROGRESS IN MBFR.

-- THE GERMANS' RATHER POSITIVE REACTION INDICATES THE
KINDS OF DIVISIONS THIS PROPOSAL COULD CREATE UNLESS WE
HANDLE IT CAREFULLY IN NATO.

-- IT COULD ALSO INVITE RENEWAL OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL
AT BELGRADE FOR SPECIAL SECURITY CONSULTATIONS.

IF WE ARE TO DEAL WITH IT EFFECTIVELY, WE MUST:

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 154206 TOSEC 070092

-- MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT VIGOR AND PURPOSE IN MBFR ITSELF
SO THAT OTHER ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY GERMANS, DO NOT
DECIDE TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE IN LIEU OF MBFR.
THIS MAY REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY ON GERMAN INTERESTS IN MBFR,
E.G. STABILIZING MEASURES.

-- BY FORCEFULLY MAKING CLEAR OUR POSITION ON THE
INTERESTS OF NATO AND MBFR, ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH CANNOT
DEAL BILATERALLY WITH EACH OF THE ALLIES, MOVING TOWARDS
ITS PROPOSAL BY INERTIA AND CAUTION.

PREFERRED ACTION: OBTAIN ZBIG AND HAROLD'S AGREEMENT
THAT WE MUST SEEK A COMMON NATO FRONT IN DEALING WITH
THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, INSISTING THAT IT NOT DAMAGE MBFR
AND THAT IT BE DEALT WITH ONLY IN THE NATO CONTEXT, AND
NOT BILATERALLY BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIES. NEWSOM

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, CTB, DISARMAMENT, TOSEC, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE154206
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PM:EDNEWSOM:MTM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P840163-0022
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197806115/baaaeyyy.tel
Line Count: 372
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a2304f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 aug 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2177592
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: LUNCH AGENDA WITH BROWN/BRZEZINSKI MONDAY, JUNE 19
TAGS: PFOR, MPOL, US, MBFR, (BROWN, HAROLD), (BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW), (VANCE, CYRUS R)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a2304f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014